Belarusian extradition cases in the Polish courts | In Principle

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Belarusian extradition cases in the Polish courts

Belarus is one of the countries submitting the most extradition requests to the Polish authorities. In 2025 the Polish courts considered a dozen or more such cases. But given the current political situation in Belarus, the question arises whether the extradition procedure has become an instrument for pursuing opponents of the Belarusian regime.

The picture of cooperation

In 2025 the Polish courts did not give a thumbs-up to even one request for extradition to Belarus. They found that turning suspects over was inadmissible, among other reasons out of a concern that the subject’s rights and freedoms would be violated, or because extradition would be inconsistent with Polish law. These concerns were grounded in the condition of the Belarusian justice system, the use of torture against inmates, and prosecution for political activity.

Numerous times the Polish courts found that extradition was barred because the Belarusian services and courts had become tools of persecution against inconvenient citizens. The opinions of the Polish courts on this topic are unambiguous. The Płock Regional Court, for example, stated in its ruling of 4 August 2025 (case no. II Kop 21/25): “In the court’s view, judicial trials in Belarus are used to pursue political persecution, not justice.”

They have also pointed out that a country cannot be regarded by the Polish courts as reliable when the judges there are not autonomous and irremovable, and where the right to a defence and the presumption of innocence are not respected. These problems were pointed out for example by the Legnica Regional Court in its ruling of 25 September 2025 (III Kop 28/25) and by the Gdańsk Regional Court in its ruling of 13 March 2025 (XIV Kop 9/25).

And in light of reports by international organisations, the courts have recognised that in the case of persons sought by Belarus—whether already sentenced or awaiting trial—there is a great risk of violation of the European Convention on Human Rights, e.g. Art. 3 (ban on torture) and Art. 6 (right to a fair trial). In this situation, they have also found a conflict with Polish law—e.g. the Białystok Regional Court in the ruling of 9 April 2025 (III Kop 16/25) and the Regional Court for Warsaw-Praga in the ruling of 17 July 2025 (V Kop 57/25).

Political activity

A key aspect that has arisen for years in evaluating the admissibility of extradition is allegations of politically motivated prosecution. In this respect, the Belarusian authorities have argued in various ways that extradition to Belarus is justified.

In some cases, the allegations asserted as the basis for prosecution clearly indicated that the Belarusian authorities were motivated by political considerations. For example, in the case that concluded in the ruling by the Regional Court for Warsaw-Praga of 30 October 2025 (V Kop 82/25), the person sought was accused of slandering Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. It was stated in the extradition request that the suspect had acted “on the basis of ideological hostility, expressed by an aversion to the actions and decisions of the state authorities of the Republic of Belarus, and in opposition to the existing constitutional order and the existing political system, sharing and professing ideas of social intolerance toward the authorities, with the intent, aim and desire to injure the authority of the state by spreading knowingly false fabrications defaming the sitting President.”

In the case in which the Białystok Regional Court issued a ruling on 26 September 2025 (III Kop 67/25), the allegations were politically motivated, and it was stated in the Belarusian indictment that “the defendant acted with other persons with the aim of carrying out a protest connected with dissatisfaction with the results of the election for President of the Republic of Belarus and the actions of law enforcement officers in combating mass riots.”

But sometimes the Belarusian authorities claimed that the prosecution concerned not political offences, but “common” offences, as a cover for their true motives. The Polish courts identified this approach in cases alleging tax offences (see Wrocław Regional Court ruling of 9 October 2025, III Kop 196/25). During the proceeding, the suspect claimed that he had taken part in Belarusian opposition activity. The court held that extradition was inadmissible, and that the alleged act only impacted the fiscal interests of Belarus and did not constitute a crime under Polish regulations.

Other common offences concealing the motivation of political persecution involved alleged “hooliganism” (see Lublin Regional Court ruling of 6 March 2025, III Kop 30/25) or “modification” of software (see ruling of the Regional Court for Warsaw-Praga of 21 January 2025, III Kop 114/25).

Also notable is the position taken by the Gdańsk Regional Court in its ruling of 13 March 2025 (XIV Kop 9/25). There the suspect was accused of a sexual offence, but claimed that he had taken part in protests against the Belarusian authorities. The court pointed out that this was hard to verify and there was no evidence that the proceedings constituted political persecution. Nonetheless, the court held that extradition was inadmissible because the systemic conditions in Belarus posed a risk of human rights violations.

Summary

The Polish courts take a uniform position in cases involving extradition requests from Belarus. The inadmissibility of extradition to Belarus is justified by the lack of protections for basic human rights, the subordination of the judicial branch to the executive, and politically motivated prosecutions. This may be regarded as the dominant position, even though the Polish courts are not always capable of determining to what extent the submission of an extradition request by the Belarusian authorities is repressive. It can thus be stated that in dealings with the Belarusian authorities, the Polish courts display very little trust.

Kamil Łuba, Dr Artur Pietryka, adwokat, Business Crime practice, Wardyński & Partners